This book consists of articles by Italian, Bulgarian, and German scholars on Vatican relations with the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. For an edited collection, the articles complement each other very well and taken together provide a good outline of the history and developments of Vatican Ostpolitik under Popes John XXIII and Paul VI.
At the same time, the title of the book is misleading. Cardinal Agostino Casaroli played a key role in Vatican Ostpolitik from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, first as undersecretary for extraordinary ecclesiastical affairs under John XXIII and Paul VI, then as secretary of state to John Paul II. The book, however, indicates that there were two very different phases to this Ostpolitik and that the election of a Polish pope in 1978 moved the practice of Vatican Ostpolitik from subtle diplomacy to public politics. Belying its title, the book deals only with the first phase of Casaroli's career in foreign policy and comes to an end with the election of Karol Wojty/ la as pope.
The election of Angelo Roncalli in 1958 shifted the Vatican away from the knee-jerk anticommunism of Pius XII toward more nuanced relationships with the countries of the communist bloc. In 1961, Cardinal Franz König of Vienna persuaded the pope to allow him to visit the Catholic bishops of Eastern Europe, thereby paving the way in a pastoral sense for re-establishing Vatican contact with the churches of the east. Casaroli, as undersecretary of state, followed König's travels by opening negotiations with the governments of Eastern Europe in an attempt to improve the situation of the Catholic Church in those countries and also to secure permission for the Catholic bishops to attend the meetings of the Second Vatican Council.Vatican II, with its emphasis on ecumenism, provided opportunities for new relations with the communist bloc as the Roman Catholic Church sought to reach out to the Orthodox churches of Russia and Eastern Europe. This outreach was initially facilitated by a degree of independence in Eastern Europe in the 1960s, which was curtailed after the Soviet repression of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Thereafter, the relationship with the Catholic Church was standardized by the Soviet bloc. Friendly external relations with the Vatican were permitted to the satellite countries to secure Vatican support for communist peace ini-tiatives and other collaborative programs; at the same time, however, Moscow decreed that no internal concessions of any kind were to be granted to the Catholic churches of Eastern Europe.
In Bulgaria, this policy was followed throughout the 1970s, with many external demonstrations of good will but with internal concessions only being granted to the Bulgarian church after the election of John Paul II. In Hungary, the Vatican had something to offer the Hungarian government. König met frequently with Cardinal József Mindszenty, who had been living in the U.S. embassy in Budapest since 1956, and eventually persuaded him to leave Budapest in 1971, which then allowed Casaroli to negotiate a better position for the Church with the Hungarian government.
A major opportunity for Casaroli and the Vatican were the discussions between the states of Eastern and Western Europe in the early 1970s leading to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which opened in Helsinki in 1973 and concluded with the signing of a Final Act in 1975. Although the conference had resulted from a Soviet initiative, the Vatican announced in 1972 that it intended to be a full participant.The Holy See sought pan-European discussions on human rights and religious freedom, and was rewarded when these provisions were written into the Final Act of 1975. Casaroli was a major figure in the conference and actively sought to involve other churches in these discussions, thereby creating a network that played a significant role when the Soviet bloc entered the years of crisis after 1989.
Casaroli's Ostpolitik complemented that practiced by Willy Brandt as chancellor of West Germany between 1969 and 1974. Discussions in the early 1970s were of interest to West Germany, East Germany, and the Vatican. Brandt wanted an opportunity to speak to the East Germans about existing borders, the Vatican wanted to sort out Polish-German borders and also diocesan boundaries in Poland and Germany, and East Germany wanted recognition as a separate state and of its borders and diocesan boundaries. Casaroli had opened negotiations with the German Democratic Republic while negotiating separately with the Bonn government. He soon came to see that the CSCE process would provide an opportunity to negotiate with both states and for them to talk to each other out of the public spotlight. In this way, the German issue became central to CSCE discussions, and Casaroli enjoyed an advantage through his position outside of the western and eastern camps.As a result of these negotiations, diocesan boundaries in East Germany and Poland were defined, and Paul VI was able to name bishops for the new dioceses.
Moscow watched these developments with suspicion but without a coordinated response because of the variety of Soviet agencies with an interest in religious policy.The KGB, from the time of Vatican II, had seen the Vatican as a tool of U.S. policy intent on destabilizing the Soviet Union. The Soviets resisted all negotiations with the Vatican and instructed their satellites accordingly. Yet, with the election of Wojty/la in 1978, Moscow interpreted this as a dangerous intensification of Vatican anticommunism, despite the fact that the naming of Casaroli as secretary of state gave the impression of a continuation of Ostpolitik. In meetings of the Soviet government following the pope's spectacular visit to Poland in 1979, it was agreed that this pope was the worst of all possible outcomes for the Soviet Union.The stability of Poland was essential to Soviet power in Eastern Europe, but this stability was directly challenged by the new pope.
Many of the articles are of high quality, drawing on current secondary sources, memoirs, and original archival sources from Bulgaria, Germany, and Russia. Particularly impressive are the articles by Svetlozar Eldarov on Ostpolitik in Now in an updated edition that supplants the 2004 original, Patrick Carey's Catholics in America displays a rare combination of qualities: it is both encyclopedic and easily digestible. Carey begins with Columbus's landing and ends with sexual abuse, as well as recent controversies over the Iraq War and immigration. As with all histories of such sweeping scope, the narrative is advanced by great men and few great women. But in the process, he finds room for the "view from the pew" and relates intrachurch developments to the larger narrative of American politics and culture. Although the story concludes before page 200, the complexity of American Catholicism's historical development is always on display.
The book is divided into eleven concise chapters, all of which pursue the themes of change and continuity, unity and diversity, and alienation and reconciliation between Catholics and American society. Whether focusing on the problem of creating a strong institutional foundation without government support, the difficulty of forging strategies that could maximize appeal both to Roman authorities and anti-Catholic bigots, or the more recent challenge of sustaining some semblance of Catholic unity amidst the "dizzying diversity" (p. ix) of the contemporary Catholic population, Carey demonstrates how both clerics and laity improvised whenever necessary. He also shows how, at any given time, they pursued multiple strategies for affirming
